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Today’s science provides quite a lean picture of time as a mere geometric evolution parameter.
I argue that time is much richer. In particular, I argue that besides the geometric time, there is
creative time, when objective chance events happen. The existence of the latter follows straight
from the existence of free-will. Following the french philosopher Lequyer, I argue that free-will is a
prerequisite for the possibility to have rational argumentations, hence can’t be denied. Consequently,
science can’t deny the existence of creative time and thus that time really passes.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is free-will for a physicist? This is a very per-
sonal question. Most physicists pretend they don’t care,
that it is not important to them, at least not in their pro-
fessional life. But if pressed during some evening free dis-
cussions, after a few beers, surprising answers come out.
Everything from “obviously I enjoy free-will” to “obvi-
ously I don’t have any free-will” can be heard. Similarly,
questions about time lead to vastly different, though gen-
eral quite lean discussions: “Time is a mere evolution pa-
rameter”, “Time is geometrical” are standard claims that
illustrate how poorly today’s physics understands time.
Consequently, a theory of quantum gravity that will have
to incorporate time in a much more subtle and rich way
will remain a dream as long as we don’t elaborate deeper
notions of time.
I like to argue that some relevant aspect of time is not
independent of free-will and that free-will is necessary
for rational thinking, hence for science. Consequently,
this aspect of time, that I’ll name creative time - or
Heraclitus-time - is necessary for science. For different
arguments in favor of the passage of time, see, e.g., [1, 2].
The identification of time with (classical) clocks is
likely to be misleading (sorry Einstein). Clocks do not
describe our internal feeling of the passage of time, nor
the objective chance events that characterize disruptive
times - the creative time - when something beyond the
mere unfolding of a symmetry happens. Indeed, clocks
describe only one aspect of time, the geometric, boring,
Parmenides-time.
But let’s start from the beginning. Before thinking
of time and even before physics and philosophy, we
need the possibility to decide what we’ll consider as
correct statements that we trust and believe and which
statements we don’t trust and thus don’t buy. Hence:
Free-Will comes first, in the logical order; and all the
rest follows from this premise.
Free-will is the possibility to choose between several
possible futures, the possibility to choose what to be-
lieve and what to do (and thus what not to believe and
not to do). This is in tension with scientific determin-
ism1, according to which, all of today’s facts were neces-
sary given the past and the laws of nature. Notice that
the past could be yesterday or the big-bang billions of
years ago. Indeed, according to scientific determinism,
nothing truly new ever happens, everything was set and
determined at the big-bang2. This is the view today’s
physics offers and I always found it amazing that many
people, including clever people, do really believe in this
[3]. Time would merely be an enormous illusion, noth-
ing but a parameter labeling an extraordinary unraveling
of some pre-existing initial (or final) conditions, i.e. the
unfolding of some symmetry. What is the explanatory
power of such a view? What is the explanatory power of
the claim that everything was set at the beginning - in-
cluding our present day feelings about free-will - and that
there is nothing more to add because there is no possi-
bility to add anything. Clearly, I am not a compatibilist
[4], i.e. not among those who believe that free-will is
merely the fact that we always happen to “choose” what
was already pre-determined to occur, hence that nothing
goes against our apparently free choices3. I strongly be-
lieve that we truly make choices among several possible
futures.
Before elaborating on all this, let me summarize my
argument. The following sections do then develop the
successive points of my reasoning.
1 For physicists, scientific determinism is an extraordinarily strong
view: everything is determined by the initial state of the atoms
and quanta that make-up the work, nothing beyond that has any
independent existence.
2 Equally, one may claim that everything is set by tomorrow; a
fact that illustrates that time in such a deterministic world is a
mere illusion [3].
3 Compatibilism is quite fashionable among philosophers. They
argue that it is our character, reasons and power that determine
our actions [4]. But for a physicist, there is nothing like char-
acters, reasons or power above the physical state of the atoms
and quanta that make up our brain, body and all the universe.
Hence, if the physical state evolves deterministically, then there
is nothing left, everything is determined. In such a case the dif-
ference between a human and a laundry machine would only be
a matter of complexity, nothing fundamental.
2II. THE LOGIC OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Free-Will comes first in the logical order. Indeed,
without free-will there is no way to make sense of
anything, no way to decide which arguments to buy
and which to reject. Hence, there would be no ra-
tional thinking and no science. In particular, there
would be no understanding.
2. Since free-will is the possibility to choose between
several possible futures, point 1 implies that the
world is not entirely deterministic.
3. Non-determinism implies that time really exists
and really passes: today there are facts that were
not necessary yesterday4, i.e. the future is open.
4. In addition to the geometrical time, there is also
creative time. One may like to call the first one
Parmenides-time, and the second concept of time
Heraclitus-time [5]. Both exist.
5. The tension between free-will and creative time on
one side and scientific determinism on the other
side dissolves once one realizes that the so-called
real numbers are not really real: there is no in-
finite amount of information in any finite space
volume, hence initial conditions and parameters
defining evolution laws are not ultimately defined,
i.e. the real numbers that theories use as inital
conditions and parameters are not physically real.
Hence, neither Newtonian, nor relativity, nor quan-
tum physics are ultimately deterministic.
6. Consequently, neither philosophy nor science nor
any rational argument can ever disprove the exis-
tence of free-will, hence of the passage of time.
III. FREE-WILL COMES FIRST, FREE-WILL
AS A PREREQUISITE FOR UNDERSTANDING
AND FOR SCIENCE
As already mentioned in the introduction, free-will
comes first. Indeed, free-will is the possibility to choose
between several possible futures, like the possibility to
choose what to believe and what to do, hence also to
choose what not to believe and not to do.
Accordingly, without free-will one could not distin-
guish truth from false, one could not choose between
different views. For example, how could one decide be-
tween creationism and Darwinism, if we could not use our
free-will to choose among these possibilities? Without
4 Admittedly, I use the primitive concepts of today and yesterday
to get the direction of time, but the existence of creative time is
a direct consequence of non-determinism.
FIG. 1: Jules Lequyer was born in 1814 in the village Quintin
(see inset), in Brittany, France, in this house. He died in 1862,
probably committing suicide by swimming away in the sea.
free-will all supporters of any opinion would be equally
determined (programmed) to believe in their views.
In summary, without free-will there would be no way
to make sense of anything, there would be no rational
thinking and no science. In particular, there would be
no understanding. Furthermore, without free-will one
could not decide when and how to test scientific theories.
Hence, one could not falsify theories and science, in the
sense of Popper [6], would be impossible.
I was very pleased to learn that my basic intuition,
expressed above, was shared and anticipated by a poorly
known French philosopher, Jules Lequyer in the 19th cen-
tury, who wanted to simultaneously validate Science and
free-will [7]. As Lequyer emphasized: “without free-will
the certainty of scientific truths would become illusory”.
And (my addition) the consistency of rational arguments
would equally become illusory. Lequyer continues: “In-
stead of asking whether free-will is certain, let’s realize
that certainty requires free-will”5.
Lequyer also emphasized that free-will doesn’t create
any new possibilities, it only makes some pre-existing
potentialities become actual, a view very reminiscent of
Heisenberg’s interpretation of quantum theory. However,
Lequyer continues, free-will is also the rejection of chance.
For Lequyer - and for me - our acts of free-will are be-
ginnings of chains of consequences. Hence, the future is
open, determinism is wrong; a point on which I’ll elabo-
rate in the next two sections.
Lequyer didn’t publish anything. But, fortunately,
had an enormous influence on another French philoso-
pher, a close friend, Charles Renouvier who wrote about
Lequyer’s ideas and published some of Lequyer’s notes
[7, 8]. In turn, Renouvier had a great influence on the
5 Au lieu de nous demander si la liberte´ est une certitude, prenons
conscience que la certitude a pour condition la liberte´.
3famous American philosopher and psychologist William
James who is considered as one of the most influential
American psychologists. William James wrote “After
reading Renouvier, my first act of free-will shall be to be-
lieve in free-will”. This may sound bizarre, but, in fact, is
perfectly coherent: once one realizes that everthing rests
on free-will, then one acts accordingly.
IV. HENCE, THE WORLD IS NOT
DETERMINISTIC. RECONCILING FREE-WILL
WITH SCIENTIFIC DETERMINISM
The existence of genuine free-will, i.e. the possibility to
choose among several possible futures, naturally implies
that the world is not entirely deterministic. In other
worlds, today there are facts that were not necessary, i.e.
facts that were not predetermined from yesterday, and
even less from the big-bang.
Recall that according to scientific determinism every-
thing was set at the beginning, let’s say at the big-bang,
and since then everything merely unfolds by necessity,
without any possible choice. Philosophers include in the
initial state not only the physical state of the universe,
but possibly also the character of humans - and living
beings. Hence, let’s recall that according to physical de-
terminism everything is fully determined by the initial
state of all the atoms and quanta at any time (or time-
like hypersurface) and the laws of physics. For example,
given the state of the universe a nanosecond after the
big-bang, everything that ever happened and will ever
happen - including the characters, desires and reasons of
all humans - was entirely determined by this initial con-
dition. In other words, nothing truly new happens, as
everything was already necessary a nanosecond after the
big-bang.
But how can one reconcile ideas about free-will such
as summarized in the previous sections with scientific de-
terminism? Or even with quantum randomness? This
difficulty led many philosophers and scientists to doubt
the very existence of free-will. These so-called compati-
bilist changed the definition of free-will in order to make
it compatible with determinism [4]. Free-will, they argue,
is merely the fact that we are determined to never choose
anything that doesn’t necessary happen. Nevertheless,
compatibilists argue, we have the feeling that our “nec-
essary choices” are free. This sounds to me like a game of
words, some desperate tentative to save our inner feeling
of free-will and scientific determinism. But, as Lequyer
anticipated, free-will comes first, hence there is no way
to rationally argue against its existence, for rational ar-
guing requires that one can freely buy or not buy the
argument: genuine compatibilists must freely decide to
buy the compatibilists’ argument, hence compatibilists
must enjoy free-will in Lequyer’s sense. Moreover, and
this is my main point, scientific determinism is wrong,
hence there is no need to squeeze free-will in a determin-
istic world-view.
Let me emphasize that since free-will comes first, i.e.
the possibility to choose between several possible futures
comes first, and since this is incompatible with scientific
determinism, the latter is necessarily wrong: the future
has to be open, as we show in the next section.
Before explaining why physics, including classical New-
tonian physics, is not deterministic, let me address first
two related questions: When do random (undetermined)
events happen? What triggers random events?
Already when I was a high school student, long before
thinking seriously about free-will, the concept of random-
ness and indeterminism puzzled me a lot [9]. When can
a random event happen? What triggers its occurrence?
If randomness is only a characteristic of long sequences,
as my teachers told me, then what characterizes individ-
ual random events? What is the probability of a singular
event? Aren’t long sequences merely the accumulation of
individual events6?
The only interesting answer to the question “when do
random events happen?” I could find was given by yet
another 19th century French philosopher (there is no way
to escape from one’s cultural environment), Antoine A.
Cournot [10]. His idea was that chance happens when
causal chains meet. This is a nice idea, illustrated, e.g.,
by quantum chance which happens when a quantum sys-
tem encounters a measuring device7.
This idea can be illustrated by everyday chance events.
Imagine that two persons, Alice and Bob meet up by
chance in the street (taken from [11]). This might hap-
pen, for example, because Alice was going to the restau-
rant further down the same street and Bob to see a friend
who lives in the next street. From the moment they
decide to go on foot, by the shortest possible path, to
the restaurant for Alice and to see his friend for Bob,
their meeting was predictable. This is an example of
two causal chains of events, the paths followed by Al-
ice and Bob, which cross one another and thus produce
what looks like a chance encounter to each of them. But
that encounter was predictable for someone with a suf-
ficiently global view. The apparently chance-like nature
of the meeting was thus only due to ignorance: Bob did
not know where Alice was going, and conversely. But
6 A long sequence of pseudo-random bits is entirely given at once,
because it is entirely determined by the initial condition, i.e. by
the seed. In such a case I have no problem with the idea that the
pseudo-randomness is a characteristic of the entire sequence. But
what about long sequences of truly random bits, produced one
after the other, let’s say one per second? Each one is a little act
of creation and the sequence nothing but an accumulation of in-
dividual random bits. Accordingly, randomness of truly random
bits must be a characteristic of the individual events, not of the
sequence [9]. Notice that in the case of pseudo-randomness only
the geometric-boring-time is relevant, but in the case of true ran-
domness that concept of time is insufficient, as the creative-time
is at work (but without any free-will).
7 Note that this doesn’t solve the quantum measurement problem,
i.e. doesn’t answer the question “which configurations of atoms
constitute a measurement device?”.
4FIG. 2: Sketch of two colliding classical particles. Initially
they merely move along straight lines, nothing happens. Next,
they collide, the very detail of this process depends on in-
finitesimal digits of the initial conditions and of their shapes.
Finally, the two particles continue again along boring straight
lines.
what was the situation before Alice decided to go to the
restaurant? If we agree that she enjoys the benefits of
free-will, then before she made this decision, the meeting
was truly unpredictable. True chance is like this. True
chance does not therefore have a cause in the same sense
as events in a deterministic world. A result subject to
true chance is not predetermined in any way. But we
need to qualify this assertion, because a truly chance like
event may have a cause. It is just that this cause does not
determine the result, only the probabilities of a range of
different possible results are determined. In other words,
it is only the propensity of a certain event to be realised
that is actually predetermined, not which event obtains
[9].
Let’s have a more physicist look at that. First, consider
two colliding classical particles, see Fig. 2. Next, con-
sider a unitary quantum evolution in an arbitrary Hilbert
space, see Fig. 3. Look for a while at the latter one; it is
especially boring, nothing happens, it is just a symmetry
that displays itself. Possibly the symmetry is complex
and the Hilbert space very large, but frankly, nothing
happens as the equivalence between the Schro¨dinger and
the Heisenberg pictures clearly demonstrates. Likewise,
for a bunch of classical harmonic oscillators nothing hap-
pens. Somehow, there is no time (or only the boring
geometric time that merely labels the evolution). Simi-
larly, as long as the classical particles of Fig. 2 merely
move straight at a constant speed, nothing happens: in
another reference frame they are at rest. It is only when
the classical particles collide, or when the quantum sys-
tem meets a measuring apparatus, that something hap-
pens, as Cournot claimed.
But one may object that in phase space the point
that represents the 2 particles doesn’t meet anything. In
phase space, there is no collision, as collisions require at
least two objects and in phase space there is only one ob-
ject, i.e. one point. Moreover, the collision in real space
and the consequence of that collision is already entirely
determined by the initial conditions: in phase space it’s
only a symplectic symmetry that displays itself.
FIG. 3: Illustration of a unitary evolution in an arbitrary
Hilbert space.
And even if one assumes that each particle is initially
independent, whatever that could mean, after colliding
the 2 particles get correlated. Hence, for Cournot’s idea
to work, one would need a correlation sink. This is a
bit similar to the collapse postulate of quantum theory
which breaks correlations, i.e. resets independence (sep-
arability).
In summary, Cournot’s idea is attractive, but not en-
tirely satisfactory; it doesn’t seem to fit with scientific
determinism. It took me a very long time to realize what
is wrong with that claim.
V. REAL NUMBERS ARE NOT REALLY REAL:
MATHEMATICAL REAL NUMBERS ARE
PHYSICAL RANDOM NUMBERS
Consider a finite volume of space, e.g. a one millime-
ter radius ball containing finitely many particles. Can
this finite volume of space hold infinitely many bits of
information? Classical and quantum theories answer is a
clear “yes”. But why should we buy this assertion? The
idea that a finite volume of space can hold but a finite
amount of information is quite intuitive. However, theo-
retical physics uses real numbers (and complex numbers,
but let’s concentrate on the reals, this suffices for my ar-
gument). Hence the question: are so-called real numbers
really real? Are they physically real?
For sure, it is not because Descartes (yet another
French philosopher, but this time a well-known one)
named the so-called real numbers “real” that they are
really real.
Actually, the idea that real numbers are truly real is
absurd: a single real number contains an infinite num-
ber of bits and could thus, for example, contain all the
answers to all questions one could possibly formulate in
any human language [12]. Indeed, there are only finitely
many languages, each with finitely many letters or sym-
bols, hence there are only countably many sequences of
5letters. Most of them don’t make any sense, but one
could enumerate all sequences of letters as successive bits
of one real number 0.b1b2b3...bn..., first the sequences of
length 1, next of length 2 and so on. The first bit after
each sequence tells whether the sequence corresponds to
a binary question and, if so, the following bit provides
the answer. Such a single real number would contain an
infinite amount of information, in particular, as said, it
would contain the answer to all possible questions one
can formulate in any human language. No doubt, real
numbers are true monsters!
Moreover, almost all so-called real numbers are
uncomputable. Indeed, there are only countably many
computer programs, hence real numbers are uncom-
putable with probability one. In other words, almost
all real numbers are random in the sense that their
sequences of digits (or bits) are random. Let me
emphasize that they are as random as the outcome of
measurements on half a singlet8. And these random
numbers (a better name for real numbers) should be at
the basis of scientific determinism? Come on, that’s just
not serious!
Imagine that at school you would have learned to name
the so-called real numbers using the more appropriate
terminology of random numbers. Would you believe that
these numbers are at the basis of scientific determinism?
To name “random numbers” “real numbers” is the
greatest scam and trickery of science; it is also a great
source of confusion in the philosophy of science.
Note that not all real numbers are random. Some, but
only countably many, are computable, like all rational
numbers and numbers like pi and
√
2. Actually, all num-
bers one may explicitly encounter are computable, i.e.
are exceptional.
The use of real numbers in physics, and other sciences,
is an extremely efficient and useful idealization, e.g. to
allow for differential equations. But one should not make
the confusion of believing that this idealization implies
that nature is deterministic. A deterministic theoreti-
cal model of physics doesn’t imply that nature is deter-
ministic. Again, real numbers are extremely useful to
do theoretical physics and calculations, but they are not
physically real.
The fact that so-called real numbers have in fact ran-
dom digits, after the few first ones, has especially impor-
tant consequences in chaotic dynamical systems. After a
pretty short time, the future evolution would depend on
the thousandth digit of the initial condition. But that
digit doesn’t really exist9. Consequently, the future of
classical chaotic systems is open and Newtonian dynam-
8 That is, on a spin 1
2
maximally entangled with another spin 1
2
.
9 It’s not that there is a sharp limit on the number of digits, they
merely fade off.
FIG. 4: Poincare´ section of the forced and damped quan-
tum Duffing oscillator in the chaotic regime, described by
the Quantum State Diffusion model of open quantum sys-
tems [14]. Note that the axes represent quantum expectation
values of position and momentum. This strange attractor is
essentially identical to its classical analog.
ics is not deterministic. Actually most classical systems
are chaotic, at least the interesting ones, i.e. all those
that are not equivalent to a bunch of harmonic oscil-
lators. Hence, classical mechanics is not deterministic,
contrary to standard claims and widely held beliefs.
Note that the non-deterministic nature of physics may
leave room for emerging phenomena, like e.g. phenomena
that could produce top-down causes, in contrast to the
usual down-top causes we are used to in physics [13]. A
well-known example of a set of phenomena that emerges
from classical mechanics is thermodynamics which can
be deduced in the so-called thermodynamical limit. But,
rather than going to infinite systems, it suffices to merely
understand that classical mechanics is not ultimately de-
terministic, neither in the initial condition, nor in the set
of boundary conditions and potentials required to define
the evolution equations.
What about quantum theory? Well, if one accepts that
the measurement problem is a real physics problem - as
I do, then this theory is also clearly not deterministic
[11]. If, on the contrary, one believes in some form of
a many worlds view, then the details of the enormously
entangled wave function of the Universe depends again
on infinitesimal details, as in classical chaotic systems.
Note that although quantum dynamics has no hyper-
sensitivity to initial conditions, it shares with classical
chaotic systems hyper-sensitivity to the parameters that
characterize that dynamics, e.g. the Hamiltonian. Fur-
thermore, open quantum systems recover classical tra-
jectories also in the case of chaotic systems, see Fig. 4.
Hence, quantum dynamics is not deterministic. Finally,
Bohmian quantum mechanics is again hyper-sensitive to
the initial condition of the positions of the Bohmian par-
ticles; hence, like chaotic classical systems, Bohmian me-
chanics is not deterministic.
Admittedly, one may object that now we have an ana-
6FIG. 5: The real or physical world versus Pythagoras’ math-
ematical world should not be confused.
log of the measurement problem in classical physics, as it
is unclear when and how the non-existing digits necessary
to define the future of chaotic systems get determined.
This is correct and, in my opinion, inevitable. First,
because free-will comes first, next because mathemati-
cal real numbers are physical random numbers. Finally,
because physics - and science in general - is the human
activity aiming at describing and understanding how Na-
ture does it. For this purpose one needs to describe also
how humans interact with nature, how we question na-
ture [15]. Including the observer inside the description
results, at best, in a tautology without any possible un-
derstanding: there would result no way to freely decide
which description provides explanations, which argument
to buy or not to buy.
To summarize this section, claiming that classical me-
chanics is deterministic, or that quantum theory implies
a many-world view, is like elevating real numbers, the de-
terminism of Newton’s equations and the linearity of the
Schro¨dinger equation, to some sort of ultimate religious
truth. It is confusing mathematics with physics. It is a
common but profound epistemological mistake, see Fig.
5.
VI. HENCE, TIME REALLY PASSES.
GEOMETRIC-BORING TIME VERSUS
CREATIVE TIME
So far we saw that free-will comes first in the logical
order, hence all its consequences are necessary. In par-
ticular one can’t argue rationally against free-will and
its natural consequence, namely that time really passes.
We also saw that this is not in contradiction with any
scientific fact. Actually, quite the opposite, it is in accor-
dance with the natural assumption that no finite region
of space can contain more than a finite amount of infor-
mation. The widely held faith in scientific determinism
is nothing but excessive scientism.
This can be summarized with the simple chain of
implications:
Free-Will ⇒ Non-Determinism ⇒ Time Really Passes
Let us look closer at the implications for time. There
is no doubt that time as an evolution parameter exists.
To get convinced it suffices to look at a bunch of classical
harmonic oscillators (like classical clocks), or the unitary
evolution of a closed quantum system, or at the inertial
motion of a classical particle as in Fig. 2. This time is
the boring time, the time when nothing truly new hap-
pens, the time when things merely are, time when what
matters is being, i.e. Parmenides-time. One could also
name this Einstein’s time10. But let’s look at the col-
lision between the two particles of Fig. 2. The detail
of the consequences of such a collision depends on non-
existing infinitesimal digits, i.e. on mathematically real
but physically random numbers. To get convinced just
imagine a series of such collisions, this leads to chaos;
hence each collision is the place of some indeterminism,
that is of some creative time, time when what matters is
change. Hence we call this creative time Heraclitus-time
[5]. This creative time is extraordinarily poorly under-
stood by today’s science, in particular by today’s physics.
This doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist, or that it is not
important. On the contrary, it means that there are huge
and fascinating open problems in front of us, scientists,
physicists and philosophers.
Notice that this is closely related to Cournot’s idea that
random events happen when independent causal chains
meet, e.g. when two classical particles meet. The two
particles are independent, at least not fully correlated,
because their initial conditions are not fully determined.
And their future, after the collision, is not predetermined,
but contains a bit of chance.
Similarly, quantum chance happens when a quantum
system meets a measurement apparatus, as described by
standard textbooks. Admittedly, we don’t know what
a measurement apparatus is, i.e. we don’t know which
configurations of atoms constitute a measurement appa-
ratus. This is the so-called quantum measurement prob-
lem. According to what we saw, there is a similar prob-
lem in classical mechanics: despite the indeterminism in
the initial conditions and evolution parameters, things
get determined as time passes (as discussed near the end
of the previous section).
VII. CONCLUSION
Neither philosophy nor science can ever disprove the
existence of free-will. Indeed, free-will is a prerequisite for
rational thinking and for understanding, as emphasized
by Jules Lequyer. Consequently, neither philosophy nor
science can ever disprove that time really passes. Indeed,
the fact that time really passes is a necessary consequence
of the existence of free-will.
10 Einstein identified time with classical clocks, i.e. with classical
harmonic oscillators. But what about clocks based on Heraclitus’
creative time? i.e. clocks based on chaotic or quantum systems?
7The fact that today’s science - including classical New-
tonian mechanics - is not deterministic may come as a
huge surprise to many readers (including the myself of 20
years ago). Indeed, the fact that Descartes named real
numbers that are actually physically random had enor-
mous consequences. This together with the tendency of
many scientists to elevate their findings to some sort of
quasi-religious ultimate truth - i.e. scientism - lead to
great confusion, as illustrated by Laplace famous claim
about determinism and by believers in some form of the
many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, based
respectively on the determinism of Newton’s equation
and on the linearity of Scho¨dinger’s equation.
Once one realizes that science is not entirely deter-
ministic, though it clearly contains deterministic causal
chains, one faces formidable opportunities. This might
seem frightening, though I always prefer challenges and
open problems to the claim that everything is solved.
Non-determinism implies that time really passes, most
likely at the junction of causal chains, i.e. when creative
time is at work. This leaves room for emerging phenom-
ena, like thermodynamics of finite systems. It may also
leave room for top-down causality: the initial indetermin-
ism must become determined before indeterminism hits
large scale, much in the spirit of quantum measurements.
As a side conclusion, note that robots based on digital
electronics will never leave room for free-will, hence the
central thesis of hard artificial intelligence (the claim that
enough sophisticated robots will automatically become
conscious and human-like) is fundamentally wrong.
So, am I a dualist? Possibly, though it depends what
is meant by that. For sure I am not a materialist. Note
that today’s physics already includes systems that are not
material in the sense that they have no mass, like electro-
magnetic radiation, light and photons. What about phys-
icalism? If this means that everything can be described
and understand by today’s physics, then physicalism is
trivially wrong, as today’s theories describe at best 5% of
the content of the universe. More interestingly, if phys-
icalism means that everything can be understood using
the tools of physics, then I adhere to this view, though
the fact that free-will comes first implies that physics can
make endless progress, but without ever reaching a final
point. We will understand much more about time and
about free-will, though we’ll never get a full rational de-
scription and understanding of free-will. Just imagine
this debate a century ago. How naive anyone claiming at
that time that physics provides a fairly complete descrip-
tion of nature would appear today. Similarly, for anyone
making today similar claims.
Let me make a last comment, a bit off-track. Free-will
is often analyzed in a context involving human respon-
sibility, “How could we be responsible for our actions if
we don’t enjoy free-will?”. There is another side to this
aspect of the free-will question: “How could we prevent
humans from destroying humanity if we claim we are
nothing more than sophisticated robots?”, and “How
could one argue that human life has some superior value
if we pretend we are nothing but sophisticated robots?”.
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